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Abstract: Monahan offers a critique of an agonistic interpretation of Hegelian 
recognition as exclusively manifested by and through struggle, drawing out 
Hegel's positive accounts of alternative manifestations of recognition. 
Furthermore, he argues that getting Hegel right on recognition actually opens 
up fertile theoretical ground for laying out positive accounts of human 
freedom and liberation.  
Hegelian recognition is often criticized as an inadequate tool for 
theorizing human liberation. More and more, theorists of oppression 
and liberation (feminists, race theorists, queer theorists, and so on) 
are either rejecting recognition outright, or offering radical 
reinterpretations of a concept they understand to be too focused upon 
antagonistic struggle, and modeled upon the relations of dominance 
and subordination found in the familiar "Master/Slave dialectic." By 
way of a recent, and important, example, Kelly Oliver's book 
Witnessing: Beyond Recognition makes an excellent case for a 
liberatory feminist politics that transcends this agonistic (and 
patriarchal) model of human agency most often associated with 
Hegelian recognition.1 While much of her critique of this interpretation 
of recognition (which I will here refer to as the "agonistic" 
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interpretation) is constructive and fruitful, it should be noted that it is 
predicated upon a very narrow, and in my view inaccurate, 
understanding of Hegel's own account of the phenomenon. In other 
words, Oliver's criticism of this account of recognition is compelling 
and persuasive, but it is by no means clear that the agonistic account 
she offers can be rightly understood as accurately capturing Hegel's 
own understanding.  
While Hegel does devote a great deal of text to discussion of the 
ways in which recognition may be made manifest through struggle, 
where such interpretations (and those critiques based upon them) fail 
is in their presumption that struggle is the exclusive means of gaining 
recognition, and that recognition predicated upon domination is a 
normative paradigm. Hegel did indeed argue that struggle for 
recognition could be important, and that it was without doubt 
common, but he took great care to point towards ways and means 
whereby recognition, as a necessary condition for human freedom 
(and thus liberation), could be gained and maintained without the 
need for struggle. In other words, there is an understanding of 
recognition beyond struggle that Hegel explicitly describes and 
endorses. To reject recognition entirely on the grounds that it is overly 
agonistic is to throw out the baby with the proverbial bathwater. This 
is not merely because it is, in itself, an inaccurate reading of Hegelian 
recognition. My purpose in this paper is twofold. First, I will offer a 
critique of this agonistic interpretation of Hegelian recognition as 
exclusively manifested by and through struggle, drawing out Hegel's 
positive accounts of alternative manifestations of recognition. Second, 
my ultimate goal is not simply to "correct" a common misreading of 
Hegel, but to argue that getting Hegel right on recognition actually 
opens up fertile theoretical ground for laying out positive accounts of 
human freedom and liberation.  
The agonistic interpretation of recognition is by no means 
unique to Oliver. It dominates feminist theory,2 race theory,3 and 
much of twentieth century continental philosophy.4 In fact, the vast 
majority of literature concerned with oppression and liberation 
presumes that the agonistic view of recognition as struggle is both an 
accurate and-more importantly for my purposes―complete 
interpretation of Hegelian recognition. There is, in this literature, a 
myopic focus on the passages from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit 
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dealing with the "Master/Slave dialectic" and the life-and-death 
struggle. The theory of recognition that results from this narrow focus 
is surely worthy of criticism, but it is also woefully incomplete. My 
reason for focusing on Oliver's work is not merely because her work is 
representative of this dominant interpretation of Hegel within the 
literature of oppression and liberation, but also because she offers 
such a compelling critique of this agonistic reading of recognition. 
Oliver argues convincingly that a commitment to genuinely liberatory 
theory demands a rejection of the agonistic interpretation of Hegelian 
recognition. That being said, her critique of recognition is impoverished 
to the extent that it omits any reference to what Hegel himself 
referred to as pure recognition ("Dieser reine Begriff des 
Anerkennens"),5 while at the same time treating the agonistic 
interpretation as if it were complete. There are plenty of excellent 
reasons to be critical of Hegel from the perspective of gender and race 
theory, but his theory of recognition, as such, is not one of them.  
The Agonistic Interpretation: "Corrupted" 
Recognition  
According to the view I have been referring to as "agonistic," 
recognition is achieved through a process of struggle, subordination, 
and domination. In this view, the world is full of agents seeking to 
extract recognition from other agents. Since, as Oliver describes it, 
recognition requires a recognizer and a recognizee,6 many agents are 
bound to have their efforts thwarted, or at least resisted. Thus, in 
order to extract recognition from another, it becomes necessary to 
engage in a life and death struggle―one must compel recognition from 
the other, who, because the bestowing of such recognition is 
understood to constitute a kind of loss of status, will resist this 
compulsion. The ensuing struggle must result either in the death of 
one of the combatants, in which case there can be no recognition 
(because the dead are incapable of it), or one of the combatants must 
submit to and thereby recognize the other, who becomes master to 
the other's slave. This in turn establishes a relationship of dominance 
and subordination, an account of which is provided in Hegel's dialectic 
of Master and Slave.  
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There are four central tenets of the agonistic interpretation of 
Hegelian recognition. First, recognition, as a phenomenon, requires the 
participants to occupy one of two distinct roles―recognizer, or 
recognizee. There is always one (or more than one) who is recognizing 
another (or group of others), and one (or more than one) who is being 
recognized by another (or group of others). Recognition is thus always 
already a relation of asymmetry. Second, this asymmetry results in 
relations of superiority and inferiority. The one who is recognized (the 
recognizee) is thereby placed in a position of dominance vis-à-vis the 
recognizer, who in turn is subordinated through the act of recognition. 
This is simply because one of the participants is having his or her 
status as a fully human subject acknowledged, while the other is not. 
This can perhaps be most clearly seen in terms of the recognition of 
full political status. If group A is recognized by group B as having full 
political rights and privileges without being themselves so recognized, 
then group A will be in a position of political superiority. This in turn 
points toward the third central tenet, which holds that agents will tend 
to resist being placed in the subordinate position in relations of 
recognition (for what should be obvious reasons). Given that we are all 
seeking recognition, but are loathe to simply give it, it follows that 
others must be compelled to grant recognition, which results in a 
normative state of struggle. This is the fourth and last central claim of 
the agonistic view. If one's only two choices are domination or 
subordination, one will typically choose domination.7 If domination is 
only achieved through the forcible extraction of recognition from some 
other, then one's efforts must be directed toward that forcible 
extraction. In this way, struggle becomes the foundation for 
recognition as such.  
Recognition must therefore be understood, in Oliver's terms, as 
"pathological,"8 inasmuch as it fosters relations of domination and 
oppression. According to Oliver, "[c]omparison and domination are 
thus inherent in the recognition model of identity, a model that helps 
to maintain oppression and colonialism on a psychological level."9 This 
is because  
[w]ithin the pathology of recognition, subjectivity is conferred 
by those in power and on those they deem powerless and 
disempowered ... It is the desire to become objectified in order 
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to be recognized by the sovereign subject to whom the 
oppressed is beholden for his or her own self-worth.10  
It is easy to see how, within this agonistic view, one might hold that 
"Hegel portrays human consciousness as shaped primarily by 
domination, subordination, and death."11 With all of this in mind, it is 
not in the least surprising that recognition should be subjected to 
constant critique from those theorists interested in issues of 
oppression and liberation. What I am arguing here, however, is that 
this critique of recognition as overtly agonistic misses the mark, since 
the object of the critique is not really recognition per se, but rather a 
particular form of it, and a corrupted one at that.12  
The dominance of the agonistic interpretation of Hegelian 
recognition has its roots, I submit, in the myopic focus on the dialectic 
of Master/ Slave found in most twentieth-century interpretations of 
Hegel. Hegelian recognition, in other words, seems to be reduced, on 
most accounts, to the Master/Slave dialectic, without any effort to 
contextualize that dialectic or differentiate it from Hegel's treatment of 
recognition as a whole. Fortunately, recent Hegel scholarship has done 
much to undermine this view, and what follows owes a great debt to 
the work of Axel Honneth and Robert Williams in particular.13 What 
these more recent works on Hegel's account of recognition have shown 
is that the agonistic view elides any reference to pure recognition.14 It 
may be (and very likely is) the case that what I am here referring to 
as "corrupted" forms of recognition better describe actual human 
interaction as it is presently made manifest, but, especially for Hegel, 
that is only contingently true. That we find ourselves more frequently 
engaging in relations of corrupted, rather than pure, recognition, is a 
result of a failure to achieve those conditions, both individual and 
social, that are conducive to pure recognition, rather than some 
necessary moment in the development of human consciousness. This 
is not to say that pure and corrupted recognition are radically distinct 
concepts, either. Indeed, my choice to appeal to the terminology of 
corruption is intended not only to maintain consistency with Hegel's 
own use of "purity," but also to make clear the ways in which the pure 
and corrupted thing or phenomenon remains at root the same thing or 
phenomenon. What I am calling "corrupted" recognition is still a 
manifestation of recognition, it just has yet to reach its full potential. It 
is, in other words, only a suggestion of what it could become.15 
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Bearing these points in mind not only offers one a more accurate 
interpretation of Hegel, but also opens up a completely different 
approach to questions of oppression and liberation, which I shall 
discuss further below. Pure recognition offers an ideal for human 
interaction that both preserves the valuable insights the agonistic 
interpretation offers and at the same time answers the critique leveled 
against it, all the while pointing toward future directions of positive 
theoretical development as regards oppression and liberation.  
Before any account of pure recognition can get under way, 
however, it is necessary to make an important interpretive point. 
Hegel's Phenomenology is often read as a rather linear narrative of the 
development of "Spirit" (Geist). Judith Butler, for example, refers to 
the Phenomenology as a kind of "Bildungsroman, an optimistic 
narrative of adventure and edification, a pilgrimage of the spirit."16 I 
do not deny that this can be an instructive way to approach the text, 
but it is not without its weaknesses, either. Foremost, it misses the 
extent to which Hegel takes himself not to be building a conception of 
"absolute spirit" from disparate parts, but rather revealing a totality 
that was present, if only implicitly, in those parts all along. The 
structural order of the text, therefore, should not be understood as an 
instruction manual laying out the necessary steps that each 
consciousness must undergo in order to eventually cross a spiritual 
finish line. According to Philip Kain:  
This is crucially important because many readers assume that 
the Phenomenology proceeds by necessary logical deduction, 
that each successive stage is logically derived from what 
precedes ... Readers notoriously are unable to see the necessity 
involved in moving from one form of consciousness to the next. 
This perplexity arises, in my view, from mistakenly assuming 
that each stage is supposed to be logically deduced from the 
preceding.17  
And later:  
What has to be done is to show that each stage fails. But 
nothing specific necessarily follows from that failure-certainly 
the next stage is not logically deduced ... It is we who make the 
leap to the next stage in order to overcome the inadequacies of 
the preceding stages. There is no problem with transitions from 
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stage to stage. Hegel strategically thinks up the next stage 
himself.18  
In short, the "story" of the Phenomenology ought not be read 
exclusively as a sort of prescriptive narrative. This in turn means that 
the dialectic of master and slave should be read as an illustration of a 
larger point about the structure of intersubjective relations, and not as 
a paradigm for human interaction.  
With this claim about the interpretive approach to the 
Phenomenology in mind, we are now equipped to grapple with the role 
of recognition (both pure and corrupted) in the Hegelian system.  
Pure Recognition  
In the moment of Desire, from which Hegel's discussion of 
recognition in the Phenomenology emerges, the agent is motivated by 
an urge to demonstrate that she is a "simple universal,"19 in that she 
takes herself to be complete, self-contained, and self-sufficient. She 
confronts a world of merely contingent, inessential objects, and 
understands herself to be the sole manifestation of necessity and 
independence. To maintain this belief, agents in the moment of Desire 
must engage in a constant process of negation. If I am to preserve my 
position as pure, unfettered subjectivity, then I must negate all 
external obstacles, usually by consuming or destroying them.20 In so 
doing, I demonstrate their dependence upon my whim for their 
continued existence. Thus, if I am to maintain my "selfcertainty" in the 
moment of Desire, I must involve myself in a constant effort to 
vanquish or destroy anything that might present itself as an object 
independent of my own consciousness.21  
All of this may appear rather abstract and esoteric, and certainly 
Hegel's prose style does nothing to mitigate this appearance, but in 
fact this approach to the world is all too common. Hegel's own use of 
the concept of simplicity in his term "simple universal" is in fact rather 
helpful here, for it points to the sense in which the moment of Desire 
seeks a lack of complications. If my consciousness exists at the end of 
the day in a manner that is related to, dependent upon, or otherwise 
"embedded" within social, material, and/or historical circumstances 
and contexts, then my subjectivity becomes convoluted rather quickly. 
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I can attempt to avoid this complexity by demonstrating that these 
"external" factors are in fact completely distinct from my agency,22 and 
furthermore, subordinate to it. By negating difference, I maintain the 
illusion of my own complete self-sufficiency. The moment of Desire, in 
other words, is a manifestation of the belief that one is, effectively, the 
only subject on the scene. An agent manifesting this moment of 
consciousness will view the rest of the world, including the people in it, 
either as tools for his own use, or obstacles to be overcome. And in 
crushing those obstacles, or employing those tools, he demonstrates 
to himself that he alone is possessed of true subjectivity and agency. 
He becomes the lone active agent in a world of passive objects.  
The moment of Desire serves as a perfect example of the 
interpretive point made at the end of the previous section. It is a 
moment not simply in the chronological sense, but more importantly in 
the sense that it is a mode of consciousness that one may be 
manifesting, may have once manifested, may manifest in the future, 
or may be able to incorporate into one's consciousness without having 
to necessarily experience it first hand at all. What is important about 
the moment of Desire in the Phenomenology is that the reader grasp 
the internal contradiction that, according to Hegel, inevitably flows 
from it. This contradiction emerges from the simple fact that each 
effort to demonstrate one's status as "simple universal" by negating 
some object is itself a proof that there are independent objects. If 
there really were no independent objects, if I really were the source of 
all that is, then I wouldn't need to swagger about consuming or 
destroying all that crossed my path. Furthermore, even if this weren't 
the case, the "independence" gained in the act of negation is itself 
dependent upon never-ending reiterations of that act. The moment I 
stop consuming or annihilating, I am admitting defeat―I am allowing 
independence to external objects. One could understand the very 
nomenclature as indicative of the self-defeating nature of this moment 
of consciousness. It is "Desire" precisely because it can never be 
satiated. Desire seeks what can never be, but what it dimly perceives 
must be. It seeks a status ("simple universal") that is ultimately only a 
caricature of what Hegel believes to be the truth of human 
consciousness. It is in the realization of the ultimate futility of Desire, 
for Hegel, that we come to realize the need for an encounter with 
another consciousness.  
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Before I spell this out, a more mundane example is in order. To 
be sure, very few individuals, if any, will fully manifest the moment of 
Desire as Hegel describes it in the Phenomenology. But elements of 
this mode of consciousness are not at all uncommon. At its root, the 
moment of Desire is a drive to inhabit a world in which nothing can 
rise up to challenge one's subjectivity. In the moment of Desire, I seek 
to demonstrate that nothing is capable of thwarting my will―that I am 
the only agent in the world worth the name. Consider, by way of 
example, someone who is deeply committed to the ideal of the 
"rugged individualist" in a manner that is as much John Galt as it is 
John Wayne. The individualist, let us call her Ann, will surely not 
destroy everything and everyone around her merely on whim, but she 
seeks to become as "self-sufficient" and "independent" as possible. 
She will psychologically, and perhaps even physically, distance herself 
as much as she can from the "outside" world, seeking to situate 
herself such that she need never rely on anyone else. To do otherwise 
she takes to be a sign of weakness. On one extreme, this might mean 
acquiring the skills and knowledge necessary to survive on her own in 
the wilderness, "living off the land" and "fending for herself." On the 
other extreme, it might mean that Ann will seek to acquire enough 
wealth that she need never concern herself with her own physical 
needs (that's what good servants are for) or the social world (that's 
what good legal and administrative staff are for). Either way, Ann is 
setting herself up as a "simple universal." Other individuals, social 
bodies, material objects, and the natural world exist only as tools or 
obstacles to be mastered, overcome, or at the very least, ignored. She 
does whatever she can to prove to herself that she is in complete 
control of her life, that nothing is left to chance (or worse, to the will of 
others), and that nothing intrudes upon her world except by her 
consent. Ann's life becomes organized around this constant effort to 
assert her complete independence.  
While this is an admittedly extreme example of individual 
behavior, it in fact appeals to ideals that dominate much of the North 
American cultural and ideological landscape. The "self-made-man," the 
captain of industry, and the romantic loner carving out a solo 
existence in the American wilderness all appeal to this notion of 
perfect self-sufficiency. This example is instructive not simply because 
there may or may not be individuals that manifest this extreme 
version of the moment of Desire, but because these elements of the 
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moment of Desire, as they exist in these iconic cultural tropes, are so 
common and influential. Desire, therefore, is not only some discrete 
moment of our own consciousness that we must confront and then 
leave behind, it is something that deeply informs our understanding of 
ourselves and our world on a cultural level.23 We are thus confronting 
it constantly, and, according to Hegel, a firm grasp of its internal 
contradictions can only aid us in avoiding its more pernicious 
consequences.  
Remember that what the agent seeks in the moment of Desire 
is a kind of affirmation of her own subjectivity. She wants proof that 
she exists as a subject able to exert her will over the world around 
her. But, as we have seen, the modus operandi of Desire cannot 
satisfy this need for proof and certainty. For Hegel, only pure 
recognition is able to provide this affirmation of agency that each 
subject needs in order to fully develop. The problem with the moment 
of Desire lies not merely in its method, but in the conception of agency 
that informs it. For Hegel, we can never be the "simple universal" 
posited in the moment of Desire, for human being means existing both 
as universal and particular.24 The moment of Desire seeks to eliminate 
all particularity. The agent in the moment of Desire is seeking to 
overcome his history, his culture, his social standing, the physical and 
human obstacles in his way, and so on. That is, he seeks to annihilate 
all particularity from his existence. What recognition provides is a way 
to bridge this gap between universality and particularity within the 
consciousness of the agent, by allowing the agent to experience 
herself both as a situated, particular object enmeshed in a 
sophisticated system of other objects and forces, as well as being an 
independent consciousness capable of acting on this larger system of 
objects and forces in a way that generates new and different 
possibilities of further action and self-expression.  
In pure recognition, the agent is able to exist as a self-conscious 
agent for another self-conscious agent, which means that the agent 
exists for himself as both a subject and an object simultaneously. In 
the Phenomenology, and many subsequent discussions of Hegelian 
recognition, recognition is elaborated in the scope of an I/thou 
encounter between two agents. This is clearly an instructive way to 
think through recognition, but as I shall show later, a narrow focus on 
this I/thou level can be very limiting, and even misleading. For the 
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moment, however, using a two-agent example will prove most helpful 
in fleshing out the differences between pure and corrupted recognition.  
In order to keep this first example as straightforward as 
possible, imagine two agents, Matt and Mary, who are about to engage 
in pure recognition. Matt, in recognizing Mary, affirms openly that she 
is another self-conscious agent like himself. This in turn means that 
Matt recognizes that he is himself an object for Mary's 
consciousness―he is an other for her, because she, like him, is 
capable of consciously attending to the world around her. This is 
important first because Matt is acknowledging their shared status as 
subjects, and second because in order for Matt to realize that he is an 
object of Mary's consciousness, he must exercise his own 
subjectivity―he has to perform this realization that he is an object of 
Mary's consciousness as an agent. In other words, Matt must manifest 
his subjectivity in order to apprehend himself as an object for Mary. 
Mary, meanwhile, is performing the same exercise in relation to Matt. 
When both agents approach the other in this way, this means that 
their self-consciousness is rendered explicit through this manifestation 
of reciprocal (pure) recognition. If Matt recognizes Mary, who is in turn 
recognizing him, then Matt has his own subjectivity "given" back to 
him,25 but in a way that opens it up to a kind of public affirmation. 
Matt apprehends another subject, who is, through her recognition of 
him as himself a subject, showing him his own agency "in the world." 
His status as a self-conscious agent becomes importantly real for him 
in a way that was impossible without this reciprocal recognition.  
It should be clear at this point that the manifestation of 
recognition described above only works when both agents are willing 
to fully recognize the other. In Hegel's words, "[a]ction by one side 
only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought 
about by both."26 It is in this necessity for reciprocity that the "purity" 
of pure recognition lies. Without reciprocity, the full benefits of 
recognition are lost to both parties. If Matt recognizes Mary, but she is 
unwilling to recognize him, then he does not have his own status as an 
agent rendered explicit, because Mary does not openly acknowledge 
this status. At the same time. Mary cannot have her own subjectivity 
made explicit, since she refuses to accept that Matt is a subject 
capable of acknowledging her own subjectivity. According to Hegel, the 
reciprocity of pure recognition is significant "because it is indivisibly 
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the action of one as well as of the other."27 In pure recognition, in 
other words, the agents "recognize themselves as mutually 
recognizing one another."28 If one or both parties refuse to recognize 
the other, then recognition becomes corrupted.  
The account of pure recognition described above is contained 
entirely in paragraphs 178-184 of the Phenomenology. Paragraph 185 
serves as a transition between pure and corrupted recognition, and is 
worth quoting in its entirety:  
We have now to see how the process of this pure Notion of 
recognition, of the duplicating of self-consciousness in its 
oneness, appears to self-consciousness. At first, it will exhibit 
the side of the inequality of the two, or the splitting-up of the 
middle term into the extremes which, as extremes, are opposed 
to one another, one being only recognized, the other only 
recognizing.29  
Thus, what preceded paragraph 185 was an account of reciprocal, pure 
recognition, and what follows it is only an account of the dialectic of 
recognition in an impure form. Thus, "this pure Notion of recognition," 
only "appears," "at first," in the form of these two extremes (Master 
and Slave), but this is mere appearance, and should not be properly 
understood as a normative account of recognition as such. As I shall 
argue later, what is described in the Master/Slave dialectic is still 
recognition, but it is far from pure, and thus not meant to be a model 
upon which to base our own actions. What is more, this "at first" 
pertains to the development of consciousness in general, not 
necessarily to the chronology of development for a given individual.  
The exclusive focus on the Master/Slave dialectic that so 
dominates appropriations of Hegel in the philosophy of oppression and 
liberation, therefore, leaves out a fundamental aspect of Hegelian 
recognition. Without pure recognition, we are indeed left with a picture 
of recognition that is thoroughly agonistic. But what should be 
apparent at this point is that any treatment of Hegelian recognition 
that works with this exclusive focus upon the Master/Slave dialectic is 
actually a treatment of Hegelian misrecognition, insofar as it takes 
corrupted recognition to be the norm. As a consequence, any critique 
of "Hegelian Recognition" that focuses upon this agonistic paradigm 
misses its target. Hegel would, in fact, agree that the Master/Slave 
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dialectic is far from ideal, that the "life and death struggle" is 
unnecessarily destructive, and that relations of domination and 
subordination are dehumanizing and contrary to human freedom. 
These are all ways in which, according to Hegel, we manifest a 
corrupted form of that which is ideal, which is constructive, and which 
is conducive (indeed, necessary) to human freedom―pure recognition.  
Oliver raises the subject of "misrecognition," but points out that 
"insofar as misrecognition presupposes an ideal recognition we are still 
operating within an economy of recognition." She goes on to argue 
that while misrecognition "is very effective in explaining the existence 
of war and oppression, if normalized it makes it impossible to imagine 
peaceful compassionate relations with others across or through 
differences."30 There are two important responses to this claim. First, 
when Oliver refers to an "economy of recognition," she is in fact 
referring to an economy of corrupted recognition, inasmuch as she 
treats the Master/Slave dialectic, and the agonistic model, as the 
paradigms of Hegelian recognition. Thus, she is correct in claiming that 
the normalization of that model would make it impossible to conceive 
of anything other than fundamentally agonistic relations between 
human beings, but my claim is that Hegel would agree with this. The 
purpose of the Master/Slave dialectic is to point out a way in which we 
can fail to manifest the ideal of pure recognition, and to reveal the 
pitfalls, and eventual resolution, of this particular detour from our 
"proper" path. Her rejection of "misrecognition," therefore, is 
unfounded.  
The second important response has to do with our 
understanding of when recognition is present. Hegel's term "pure" 
(reine) in his own account connotes an ideal that admits of degrees of 
realization. If we add water to a glass of pure alcohol, we do not then 
deny that there is alcohol in the glass. The glass of alcohol is now 
merely impure. The same would apply to descriptions of recognition. 
Manifestations of recognition that fail to be fully pure are still 
manifestations of recognition, inasmuch as they are manifestations of 
intersubjectivity. This is clear for the slave, who, in recognizing the 
master, has already begun to move beyond the solipsistic moment of 
Desire, but it is also true for the Master. According to Hegel, "The lord 
relates himself mediately to the bondsman through a being [a thing] 
that is independent, for it is just this which holds the bondsman in 
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bondage."31 It is not so much that the master refuses to recognize the 
slave as it is that the master refuses to recognize the slave as a full 
agent like the master. There is thus a rudimentary recognition even in 
this prime example of the corruption of recognition.  
Thus, Oliver is correct to point out that "misrecognition" is still 
recognition. However, returning to my example, there is a real 
difference between pure and impure alcohol. They will behave 
differently when exposed to open flame, for instance, they have 
different density, and they affect the human body differently if 
consumed. In the same way, there is a real difference between pure 
and impure recognition. To point out that they are both manifestations 
of the same basic phenomenon does not mean that they are equally 
valuable, or that they function in the same way, or that they have the 
same impact on the participants. Conversely, to understand corrupted 
recognition as if it were not recognition at all would create a radical 
distinction between pure recognition on the one hand, and an utter 
lack of recognition on the other. Reciprocity would then be not an 
alteration (though an important one) of an already existing relation, 
but the emergence of a completely new and distinct relation. By 
maintaining the ultimate similarity of pure and corrupted recognition, 
the transition from corruption to purity becomes less opaque-it is a 
matter of shaping what already exists into a more ideal form. Pure 
recognition is qualitatively distinct from impure recognition, even if 
they are at root different manifestations of the same phenomenon.  
Oliver is, of course, quite right to reject the norm that she 
describes. Recognition that is conferred upon a subordinate by one in a 
dominant position is far from liberating, and to seek to have this 
recognition conferred upon oneself by a superior is surely pathological. 
Frantz Fanon makes this point explicitly in his discussion of Hegel in 
Black Skin, White Masks, a text that Oliver appeals to in her own work. 
It is worth quoting Fanon at length:  
There is not an open conflict between white and black. 
One day the White Master, without conflict, recognized the 
Negro slave.  
         But the former slave wants to make himself recognized.  
         At the foundation of Hegelian dialectic there is an absolute 
reciprocity which must be emphasized. It is in the degree to 
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which I go beyond my own immediate being that I apprehend 
the existence of the other as a natural and more than natural 
reality. If I close the circuit, if I prevent the accomplishment of 
movement in two directions, I keep the other within himself. 
Ultimately, I deprive him even of this being-for-itself.  
        The only means of breaking this vicious circle that throws 
me back on myself is to restore to the other, through mediation 
and recognition, his human reality, which is different from 
natural reality. The other has to perform the same operation.32  
What is crucial about this passage is the way in which Fanon is 
explicitly referring to pure recognition as a remedy for dominance and 
subordination. Indeed, immediately after the section above, he directly 
quotes Hegel's claims that recognition must be reciprocal in 
paragraphs 182 and 184 of the Phenomenology. Fanon later offers 
some very stimulating criticisms of the application of Hegelian 
recognition within a racist/ colonial context, but it is clear that he does 
not simply reduce his understanding of recognition to an agonistic one. 
It is a serious mistake to reduce Hegelian recognition as such to the 
agonistic and oppressive model offered in the Master/Slave dialectic, 
and both Hegel and Fanon realized this.  
A full account of Hegelian recognition, even one drawn only from 
the Phenomenology, is inconsistent with the agonistic interpretation. 
What is more, the critiques of recognition that prove so telling against 
the agonistic interpretation are not tenable when turned on an account 
that incorporates pure recognition. Hegel deserves to be criticized for 
his treatment of women and non-whites in his discussions of history, 
anthropology, and the family. The critiques of recognition offered by 
those who hold to the agonistic interpretation, however, have thus far 
missed the mark.  
The Uses and Abuses of Recognition  
While it should be clear at this point that the agonistic model of 
Hegelian recognition is based upon a misinterpretation of the role of 
recognition in the Phenomenology, it remains to be seen how 
correcting this interpretive error will yield any benefits for theorists 
interested in addressing issues of oppression and domination. In order 
to make this case fully, it will be necessary to move beyond the 
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Phenomenology and look closely at Hegel's treatment of recognition 
both in the Philosophy of Mind and the Philosophy of Right.  
It is the reciprocal nature of pure recognition which is key for 
understanding the role it plays, according to Hegel, in human freedom. 
Recall that the function of recognition is to provide a manifestation of 
one's own agency (subjectivity) in the world, by having it "given back" 
(or affirmed)33 by another consciousness. For Hegel, what is 
essentially being affirmed in such cases is the freedom of oneself, and 
the other. In discussing recognition in the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel 
makes this explicit:  
Only in such a manner [pure recognition] is true freedom 
realized; for since this consists in my identity with the other, I 
am only truly free when the other is also free and is recognized 
by me as free. This freedom of one in the other unites men in 
an inward manner, whereas needs and necessity bring them 
together only externally. Therefore, men must will to find 
themselves again in one another.34  
In short, only a free subject can truly recognize and affirm my own 
freedom.35 According to Hegel, if I coerce recognition it is immediately 
corrupted, and the truth of my freedom remains obscured. This is why 
Hegel goes on in this same paragraph to discuss the importance of 
struggle and the risking of one's life for freedom. Indeed, as we shall 
see, according to Hegel, true freedom for one demands the freedom of 
all. In order to grasp this particular argument, however, three further 
general points need to be made.  
First, some further discussion of the role of struggle and the 
staking of one's life in Hegelian recognition is warranted. This is, 
clearly, one of the cornerstones of the agonistic account of recognition, 
and there is, to be sure, ample textual evidence to support the fact 
that Hegel took struggle to be quite important. But again, this textual 
evidence needs to be placed within its proper context. First and 
foremost, Hegel makes it clear in the Philosophy of Mind that he does 
not intend struggle and conflict to be the norm:  
To prevent any possible misunderstandings with regard to the 
standpoint just outlined [life and death struggle for recognition], 
we must here remark that the fight for recognition pushed to 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 32, No. 3 (July 2006): pg. 389-414. Publisher Link. This article is © Florida State University 
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Florida State University does 
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Florida State University. 
17 
 
the extreme here indicated can only occur in the natural state, 
where men exist only as single, separate individuals; but it is 
absent in civil society and the State because here the 
recognition for which the combatants fought already exists.36  
It should be kept in mind here that "civil society" and the "State" refer 
to ideal (Real in Hegel's terminology) manifestations, and not 
necessarily to presently existing (Actual) ones. Recall also that the 
Master/Slave dialectic and the account of the life and death struggle 
for recognition are both "just-so" stories designed to make certain 
points about the nature and development of human consciousness. 
They are in many ways analogous to the Rawlsian "original 
position"―they are useful fictions designed to facilitate certain kinds of 
theoretical maneuvering. If it were truly necessary for every agent to 
engage in a life or death struggle with every other agent, then the 
Hegelian world would share many unsavory characteristics of the 
Hobbesian state of nature (especially nastiness, brutishness, and 
brevity).  
The reason why the life and death struggle is important, for 
Hegel, is because it is through the staking of one's life that one asserts 
one's commitment to values and causes that transcend immediate 
physical existence.37 This is not an endorsement of some form of 
mind/body dualism (indeed, Hegel is highly critical of any such 
distinction). Hegel is not urging us to reject our status as physical 
beings. The point is rather that we make explicit, through our 
willingness to risk our very existence, our commitment to something 
beyond ourselves. Part of the wrong of the corrupted recognition made 
manifest in the dialectic of Master and Slave is that the master 
attempts to reduce the slave to a purely physical object―a physical 
extension of the will of the master. The choice to risk one's life to alter 
this condition is in itself a rejection of that "objectification." In the 
"natural state" that Hegel references in the passage quoted above, this 
will require direct physical confrontation with another, but within a 
more sophisticated social setting, one's status as a subject can be built 
in to the practices, mores, and institutions within which one is so 
deeply enmeshed. In such a setting, literal life and death struggle can 
become no longer necessary, though of course, it is also possible to 
have corrupted recognition "built in" to one's social environment, 
which leads to the second general point.  
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In both the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Mind, 
Hegel's discussions of recognition tend to focus on a two-agent, I/thou 
model. This has clear advantages in terms of exposition, but a 
reduction of recognition to this two-person norm can be very 
misleading. Real people in the real world do not wallow in the 
solipsistic excesses of the moment of Desire, only to at long last 
encounter another lone consciousness, and engage in a life or death 
struggle. We come into the world deeply enmeshed in a complex and 
sophisticated web of linguistic, cultural, religious, and institutional 
norms and practices that condition the ways and means whereby we 
interact with others, who are themselves likewise situated. We quite 
literally find ourselves in a series of situations in which we are able to 
experience and manifest relationships with varying degrees of 
reciprocity (purity). Gender, race, class, sexuality, and myriad other 
variables condition the possibilities of interaction with other individuals 
and institutions. While this opens up massive possibilities for 
corrupting recognition, it is also crucial to understanding the function 
of recognition in Hegel's politics―the cornerstone of which is his 
concept of Ethical Life (Sittlichkeif).  
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes Ethical Life as 
composed of the family, "civil society," and the state. These are 
interdependent facets that work together to provide ways and means 
whereby agents can interact with other agents and institutions in what 
Hegel hopes will be constructive ways. Ethical Life, put simply, is the 
larger social context in which all agents find themselves embedded. It 
both provides the ground upon which we are able to interact 
(language, custom, law, and so on), as well as conditioning that 
interaction-such that it either fosters or hinders manifestations of pure 
recognition. As the passage quoted above from the Philosophy of Mind 
makes clear, recognition is, for Hegel, ultimately directed toward 
freedom. The same holds for Ethical Life. As he states, "Ethical Life is 
accordingly the concept of freedom which has become the existing 
[vorhandenen] world and the nature of self-consciousness."38 Ethical 
Life, therefore, may be understood in part as the ways in which 
recognition (both pure and corrupted) becomes ossified and rendered 
concrete through our "normalized" social practices and ways of 
interacting. When the manifestations of recognition found in the 
institutions39 and practices of Ethical Life are corrupted, then the 
recognition I am able to manifest will more likely be corrupted, and 
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vice-versa. The key to realizing human freedom, therefore, is not 
constant struggle or perpetual reiterations of the master/slave 
dialectic, but rather the formation of the kind of social world in which 
pure recognition is fostered as the norm of human interaction. It may 
very well involve (political and individual) struggle to achieve this end, 
but this is a far cry from the visions of gladiatorial bloodsport that tend 
to dominate the agonistic paradigm of Hegelian recognition.  
The third and final general point to be made has to do with the 
treatment of recognition as a static state of being. Recognition, both 
pure and impure, must be understood as an always incomplete 
process, and not as something one accomplishes in any final way. It is 
not a static state, but a manifestation of a continuous process. Far 
from being a discrete event or task, recognition must be an ongoing 
effort to reveal what for Hegel is the underlying truth of human 
interaction. It therefore requires constant maintenance, critical 
reappraisal, and reaffirmation. Even on the more simplistic I/thou 
level, the moment one party decides that he is "finished" with the 
other, reciprocal recognition is lost, and the two agents will either part 
ways completely or begin to manifest some more or less corrupt form 
of recognition. If we begin to take into account our social being, things 
become rapidly more complex. One's ability to manifest pure 
recognition with any given agent will be conditioned and influenced by 
one's relations with other agents. And if we furthermore begin to take 
into account the formal and informal institutions and practices that 
make up the "substance" of Ethical Life, yet further levels of 
complexity emerge. Put as simply as I am able, the point is that, in 
order to really take seriously the freedom and agency of another, one 
needs to understand that that freedom and agency are themselves 
undergoing constant revision. If I ever take myself to have a complete 
grasp of another, so that I have "recognized" him fully, then I have 
already taken a step toward dehumanizing him by treating him as a 
"dead" object, rather than as a living, changing, subject. Thus, even 
corrupted recognition cannot be "granted" or "conferred," because it is 
not a thing or a static state of being. Recognition of any type requires 
constant nurturing and maintenance. Even the most oppressive 
manifestation of corrupted recognition will not simply continue on its 
own.  
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Pure recognition, I have argued, is a necessary component of 
any full appreciation of Hegelian recognition. What I have referred to 
as the "agonistic interpretation" not only maintains a narrow focus on 
the Master/Slave dialectic and the life and death struggle, it 
completely elides our status as socially embedded agents and the role 
of Ethical Life. Once these factors are addressed, the picture of 
Hegelian recognition that emerges is markedly different from that 
offered in much of the current literature on oppression and 
domination, in which the agonistic interpretation is hegemonic. It 
remains to be shown, however, that the interpretation of Hegelian 
recognition that I am offering here will have anything constructive to 
offer theorists of oppression and domination, and especially to show 
that, for Hegel, the freedom of one demands the freedom of all.  
It will be helpful at this point to have an example to which I can 
appeal in the course of my argument. To be sure, there are myriad 
real-life examples of deeply embedded misrecognition upon which I 
could draw. Racism, sexism, classism, religious persecution, and any 
number of other manifestations of oppression could be used quite 
fruitfully. As much as I would normally prefer to use these actual 
examples, they are incredibly complex phenomena, and a proper 
treatment of them is not possible within this essay. Consequently, I 
will have to use a more "stripped-down" example, and offer only the 
occasional gesture toward linkages with these real-life phenomena.  
That being said, consider a world in which there exist creatures 
very much like us, except that some significant minority, who have 
some clearly visible phenotypical difference from the rest of the 
populace (suppose they have three eyes), occupy a social position of 
power and privilege vis-à-vis everyone else. Three-eyed people (or 
"threes" for short) have for generations occupied important leadership 
positions in government, business, technology, science, media, and 
education, and have used their accumulated power to both prevent 
two-eyed people ("twos") from threatening their dominance, and to 
convince the twos that their inferior position is a natural consequence 
of their inherent inferiority as a separate species. Norms of behavior 
and interaction dictate that all twos should treat all threes with 
deference and respect, while threes may abuse, denigrate, or simply 
ignore the existence of twos. The legal system presumes the inherent 
criminality of twos and the inherent virtue of threes. The education 
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system teaches that all historical progress is the result of the 
exceptional talents of threes. Any two who complains about or resists 
her "place" in the social order is seen as deviant, and dismissed as a 
trouble-maker who is jealous of the "success" of others. Twos are 
severely punished for looking threes directly in the eyes, while both 
the content and methodology of education reinforces the intellectual 
inferiority of twos, and so on. In short, this is a world in which 
corrupted recognition is deeply embedded in the Ethical Life of this 
society. It impacts the way individuals understand themselves as 
individuals, how they understand themselves in relation to others, and 
how they understand themselves in relation to the formal and informal 
institutions of that Ethical Life.  
The first important consequence of taking pure recognition 
seriously is that it rules out reducing domination and oppression to the 
individualistic I/thou level. To be sure, there are important ways in 
which individual interactions manifest corrupted recognition, but this 
should always be understood within a larger context that gives force 
and meaning to those manifestations. The deepest impact on any 
given individual's sense of self comes seldom from another individual, 
and more often from the innumerable symbols, practices, and 
institutions that serve as the medium in which those individual 
interactions take place. In my admittedly simplistic example, a teacher 
who is a three is able to successfully undermine the agency of his 
pupils who are twos because there is an established history of the 
legitimacy of this project, support and resources from the larger 
institutions of education, and a deeply entrenched expectation on the 
part of both teachers and students that this is what normal education 
is. To see this simply as an evil individual harming innocent victims is 
to vastly oversimplify this phenomenon, such that a disservice is done 
to both parties.  
What is more, recognition is manifest whenever there is more 
than one subject. The important distinction is not between recognition 
and lack of recognition, but between varying degrees of purity of 
recognition. Hegel still refers to the Master/Slave dialectic as a 
manifestation of recognition, it is just recognition gone wrong. In my 
example, twos are recognized by threes, but they are misrecognized 
as inherently inferior and worthy of domination. Since, for Hegel, we 
come to know and understand ourselves through this interaction with 
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others, it stands to reason that systematically corrupted recognition 
can have a crippling impact on the first-person agency of those in the 
subordinate position. This phenomenon of "mental colonialization"―the 
idea that one can "internalize" damaging views and attitudes of those 
who are in the dominant position―is a common theme in literature on 
oppression, and the interpretation of Hegelian recognition I am 
offering is well-equipped to provide an account of it. Hegelian 
recognition allows for an account of oppression as a systemic 
corruption of recognition that saturates not only the interactions of 
individuals, but nearly every aspect of Ethical Life―the "concrete" 
social context in which each individual finds herself embedded. It 
provides an account of oppression and domination as a fundamentally 
social phenomenon, but not a reductively social one. That is, it sees 
the way in which larger social contexts and institutions condition 
individual interactions (fostering more or less pure manifestations of 
recognition on the individual level) without reducing oppression either 
to variations in distribution of social goods or to simple discrimination. 
Individuals still engage in and maintain oppression, but their actions 
must be understood within that larger social context that gives their 
individual actions force and meaning. Hegelian recognition, then, is a 
way to bridge the divide between reductively atomistic accounts of 
oppression on the one hand, reductively social/mechanical accounts on 
the other.  
Another advantage of this interpretation of Hegelian recognition 
is that it provides a proper context in which to situate the role of 
struggle in relation to human liberation. I have argued that the 
agonistic interpretation's treatment of struggle as normative is an 
overstatement of the role of struggle in recognition (and therefore 
human freedom). But while it is a mistake to understand all human 
interaction on the model of struggle, it is surely questionable (at best) 
to think that liberation for the dominated and oppressed will emerge 
without some kind of struggle. Fanon is surely correct in his claim that 
genuine freedom cannot be simply bestowed upon one from without, 
and thus some effort must be made on the part of the oppressed to 
secure their freedom. In the agonistic interpretation, we struggle to 
make the other grant us recognition. From the perspective of pure 
recognition, however, the purpose of struggle is dramatically different. 
If I compel recognition from another person, or a group or persons, or 
an institution, then the recognition thereby made manifest will 
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necessarily be corrupted, since pure recognition must be freely 
undertaken by both parties. The recognition I receive from another 
who I have forced to recognize me is not the recognition of another 
free subject, and so cannot render concrete my own freedom through 
that recognition. Thus, any "struggle for recognition" which is directed 
toward compelling recognition can only ever truly be a struggle for 
corrupted recognition. What one is seeking through struggle, 
therefore, is not recognition as such, since a corrupted form of 
recognition already exists, but rather one is seeking a more pure 
manifestation of recognition. But what does this mean in practical 
terms?  
First and foremost, a struggle for purification of recognition 
must be explicitly directed toward fostering reciprocity. This means 
that the annihilation of the other is ruled out from the start, as are 
such motives as vengeance or envy. Certainly one may struggle for 
any of these purposes, but such struggles cannot be properly 
understood as directed toward pure recognition. Indeed, a struggle to 
annihilate the other may in certain circumstances be necessary for 
survival, both on an individual level, and perhaps even on a larger 
political level. The point is that such struggles, necessary and 
important as they may be, should never be understood as struggles 
for pure recognition. They may be struggles for survival, or for power, 
but not reciprocity.  
Genuine struggles for pure recognition perform two important 
and interrelated functions. Returning to the example of the differently-
eyed peoples, we encounter a situation in which struggle will be an 
important component of any liberatory effort. The oppression of the 
twos by the threes is deeply entrenched both in formal and informal 
institutions, such that many twos, and most threes, will see it as 
normal and inevitable. The first important function of struggle will 
have to do with the consciousness of the twos. If freedom emerges, as 
Hegel believes, through pure recognition, then generations of deeply 
entrenched misrecognition will cripple freedom. By resisting this 
misrecognition, the twos are demonstrating to the threes, and equally 
importantly, to themselves, that they are indeed full agents capable of 
taking action to pursue human freedom. They thereby move from a 
passive state in which they are acted upon by forces beyond their 
control to an active one in which they gradually assume more and 
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more control over the world around them, challenging what was 
previously understood to be beyond question. Struggle for pure 
recognition, then, should be understood as a means of building and 
developing agency on the part of the oppressed and dominated.  
The second function of struggle has to do with the 
consciousness of the oppressors (in my example, the threes). The 
struggle of the twos is directed practically toward changing the 
material and social conditions that keep them "in their place." As we 
have already seen, this also has the effect of demonstrating the 
agency and subjectivity of the twos both to themselves and to the 
threes. The ultimate function of struggle is to throw in the face of the 
oppressors the reality of the status of the oppressed as fully human 
agents. To be sure, many of the oppressors will resist this reality, by 
attempting to ignore it, or by explaining it away, or by attempting to 
crush those who resist their understanding of the world they inhabit. 
The point of the struggle is to make these efforts to evade the 
realization of the humanity of the oppressed as difficult as possible. 
One cannot compel this realization, but one can create conditions in 
which the usual means of avoidance become too cumbersome to 
pursue.  
What is more, these two functions are mutually reinforcing. 
When I, as a two, participate in a political struggle against my position 
as a second-class citizen, I immediately realize that I am disproving 
the myth of the "natural" and "inevitable" status of my political 
subordination. I am, for perhaps the first time, coming to terms with 
the reality of my agency (this is what we mean when we refer to 
"empowerment"). As the threes scramble to resist my efforts, they 
make clear the extent to which my efforts are having a real impact. 
They may not be fully successful in the practical sense, but by taking 
action against me, the threes are implicitly acknowledging my efforts 
(this is an example of how /misrecognition is still recognition). 
Already, my agency is being made concrete to me through the actions 
of others to crush it. Invigorated by this realization, I redouble my 
efforts, and the threes must take even more elaborate measures to 
resist my struggle. Simultaneously, when I, as a three, witness for the 
first time the struggle of the twos, I am likewise made immediately, if 
perhaps only implicitly, aware that my understanding of my dominance 
as natural and inevitable is no longer obviously true. At first, it may be 
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easy to ignore their efforts as the misguided antics of a few 
troublemakers, or explain them away as the inevitable expression of 
the inherently violent nature of twos, or simply unleash the full force 
of the police on those rioters and vandals. As the struggle persists and 
grows, however, this becomes more and more difficult, and the 
inconsistency of my position-that I am going to great efforts to resist 
the determined actions of those who I claim are without fully human 
agency-becomes harder to avoid.  
By no means do I wish to elide the complications and difficulties 
that lurk throughout this account of struggle. There are important 
questions of strategy and tactics (especially as regards the use of 
violence), and issues involving internal political organization (the role 
of gender in anti-racist struggle, and vice-versa, for example), just to 
get the list started. These are crucial issues that should be addressed. 
For now, however, it is sufficient to see that this account of struggle, 
which I am arguing is consistent with a full account of Hegelian 
recognition, is a far cry from the treatment of struggle within the 
agonistic interpretation. From a strategic perspective, for example, it 
should be clear that non-violence is as much a kind of struggle in this 
sense as is violence. Non-violence seeks to demonstrate the agency of 
those who are taking up the struggle by thwarting "business as usual" 
for the oppressors. This is as much a demonstration of agency as 
fisticuffs or guerrilla war. My main concern at present is to show that 
the struggle for pure recognition, inasmuch as it seeks not domination 
but reciprocity, is different in kind from the understanding of struggle 
that one finds in the agonistic interpretation. If I truly seek reciprocity, 
I have to bear your agency in mind even as I struggle to demonstrate 
my own to you.  
This being said, it is also important to emphasize that the 
expectations of results will be different within this interpretation of 
struggle, as well. Since recognition cannot be understood as static, 
what one seeks in struggle is not so much an end state of being but a 
new way of being. That is, there may be clearly defined practical and 
strategic goals (repeal this law, gain access to this public good, and so 
on), but "recognition" as a discrete end cannot be one of them. An 
understanding of pure recognition should inform any struggle, but only 
as an ideal of interaction toward which one aims, never as a final 
state. Indeed, as an explicit aim, a "struggle for recognition" is all but 
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incoherent. What one struggles for, in other words, is reciprocity as a 
way of interacting with others, and not as a state of being to achieve. 
Reciprocity demands that each takes seriously the goals and interests 
of the other, not such that one simply submits to the whims of the 
other or demands submission from the other, but such that decisions 
about action affecting the other are subject to negotiation and shared 
decision-making between moral equals.  
Hegel refers to this reciprocity of pure recognition as the "third 
moment," wherein the abstractions of pure universality and pure 
particularity are reconciled. The following quote from the Philosophy of 
Right addresses this point by raising an important example:  
The third moment is that "I" is with itself in its limitation, in this 
other; as it determines itself, it nevertheless still remains with 
itself and does not cease to hold fast to the universal. This, 
then, is the concrete concept of freedom, whereas the two 
previous moments have been found to be thoroughly abstract 
and one-sided. But we already possess this freedom in the form 
of feeling, for example in friendship and love. Here, we are not 
one-sidedly within ourselves, but willingly limit ourselves with 
reference to an other, even while knowing ourselves in this 
limitation as ourselves. In this determinacy, the human being 
should not feel determined; on the contrary, he attains his self-
awareness only by regarding the other as other. Thus, freedom 
lies neither in indeterminacy nor in determinacy, but is both at 
once.40  
Hegel's use of examples here is crucial. When he seeks individual 
exemplars of pure recognition, he turns not to struggles and battles to 
the death, but to friendship and love. If recognition truly is 
fundamentally agonistic, then friendship and love should themselves 
be either impossible, or simply mislabeled manifestations of 
dominance and subordination. It is clear, however, that Hegel, at 
least, does not understand them in this way. The real model of 
Hegelian recognition, therefore, is not the battle to the death and the 
master/slave dialectic, but rather relationships of friendship and love.  
Hegel's own examples also help to make clear this point about 
recognition as a way of being rather than a state of being. Friendship 
is never an end state to be accomplished. Genuine friendship 
(understood in a more or less Aristotelian sense),41 demands constant 
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attention and nurturing from both parties. This is because each 
continues to grow as individuals, which changes the nature of the 
friendship, and because the friendship itself impacts the development 
of the individuals. If two people are truly friends, they are in fact 
always seeking to better know the other and themselves through the 
friendship itself, in order to keep that friendship alive. The same is true 
with love. Love demands constant nurturing and flexibility in order to 
survive as love―it is never a "task" that can be accomplished, but is 
rather a way of relating to another that must be constantly reaffirmed 
by both parties. Pure recognition―reciprocity―should be understood in 
precisely the same way, even on the political level. The goal of 
struggle is not some altered manifestation of domination and 
oppression, but a relation between agents and groups of agents that 
will be seeking ever greater manifestations of reciprocity through an 
ever-evolving relationship that demands the constant (often critical) 
attention and affirmation of both parties. This becomes even more 
clear if we bear in mind Hegel's understanding of "self-consciousness" 
as an organizing principle for the unfolding of "Spirit" (and 
recognition). To self-consciously undertake something (like reciprocal 
recognition) means that one can never simply rest on one's proverbial 
laurels, but must constantly scrutinize oneself, and consequently one's 
relations with others.  
Concluding Remarks  
Hegelian recognition is not about constant combat directed 
toward establishing one's dominance over another, or resisting 
attempts to be dominated by the other. Nor is it about demanding or 
compelling the conferral of recognition upon oneself. If this were so, 
then Hegelian recognition would indeed be worthy of rejection as a 
tool for theorizing human oppression and liberation. But in fact, 
Hegelian recognition is about the constant effort, on the individual 
level, to establish and maintain relationships of reciprocity that are 
freely given and freely accepted. On the larger social/political level, 
recognition is about the effort (and often, but not necessarily, the 
struggle) to establish conditions that are conducive to relationships of 
reciprocity. It is never a fait accompli but requires constant attention, 
affirmation, and revision.  
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To be sure, this is an ideal, and it is an open question whether it 
is ever in fact capable of realization either on the individual or the 
social levels. I submit, however, that recognition remains an important 
and useful conceptual tool even if it is an ideal that may only be 
approached asymptotically. Even if perfectly pure recognition is 
beyond the hope of mere humans, there remains a huge difference 
between varying degrees of corrupted recognition, such that the ideal 
can remain an important organizing and guiding principle, and most 
importantly, one that can have real practical impact on our political 
practice. Holding to the ideal of reciprocal recognition provides one 
with critical tools for evaluating organizational structure, modes of 
individual interactions, forms of communication, and so on. At the 
same time, the fact that recognition is a constant process, and not a 
state to be achieved, stresses the extent to which constant vigilance 
and re-assessment of our attitudes and practices is important not 
merely for practical reasons, but also because it is itself a part of 
reciprocity (freely recognizing one as an agent means understanding 
that we are constantly growing, changing, and developing, and 
therefore demands that we re-evaluate our relationship accordingly).  
Ultimately, Hegelian recognition stands as the demand for the 
freedom of all. Even if Hegel himself saw this only dimly, or perhaps 
not at all (and there is ample textual evidence to support this), it 
follows necessarily from any full account of recognition. The extent to 
which I am able to participate in more or less pure manifestations of 
recognition is directly proportional to the extent to which I am a free 
human agent. When I fail to manifest pure recognition as a process or 
effort to gain reciprocity, I fail to find my own freedom, since it cannot 
be "given back to me" except by another free agent. By revealing the 
limitations and contradictions of corrupted recognition, Hegel makes 
this demand for total human freedom explicit.  
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